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Abstract 
Policy instruments for GHG abatement may follow different strategies. Two prominent distinct strategies that are also 
part of the EU climate protection approach are market oriented cap and trade regimes and support schemes for carbon 
free generation technologies. The two strategies differ in their impact on the energy system and thus in effectiveness of 
abatement, in economic impact, and in consequences for energy security. We contrast the EU-wide impacts of two 
policy instruments each representing a single control strategy by using the recursive-dynamic, technology rich CGE 
model NEWAGE-W. First, we consider a cap and trade regime where international emission allowance trade is 
implemented following the Kyoto-protocol. Second, we consider targets for the application of renewable energy 
sources in electricity generation. Our model results suggest that for reasons of effectiveness, economic efficiency, and 
security of supply a GHG control strategy should not merely rely on technology oriented policies. Combining a 
technology oriented strategy with a cap and trade strategy may only slightly further decrease emissions where this 
reduction is accompanied by negative growth impacts. Impacts differ between new and old member states and are 
highly sensitive to the allocation of the overall EU target. 
Introduction 
GHG control strategies 
Anthropogenic climate change largely stems from the combustion of fossil fuels in the energy 
system. In Europe (EU-25) approx. 80 % of green house gas (GHG) emissions are energy related 
and approx. one third originates from electricity generation. In the case of CO2 which by far is the 
most important GHG, the electricity sector contributes approx. 35 % to total emissions in the 
EU-25. Moreover, approx. 45 % of total primary energy demand is being directed towards the 
generation sector. Hence, the electricity system’s technological design strongly affects the 
environmental outcome, the security of energy supply as well as any potential economic impact 
induced by GHG control. Consequently, this paper explicitly emphasizes the composition of the 
electricity sector and its role for climate protection strategies. Focus is put on CO2 mitigation 
strategies. 
Policy instruments for CO2 abatement may follow different strategies. For this paper, we identify 
two distinct strategies. The first strategy draws upon national administrative emission caps 
coupled with an allowance trading scheme. This cap and trade approach is to be considered a 
market oriented approach. It is brought into affect by the Kyoto protocol. Cap and trade strategies 
aim at indirectly changing the comparative advantages of distinct energy carriers and energy 
conversion technologies based on their specific emissions. Consequently, they can be considered 
market pull strategies. 
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 The second strategy is a direct technology oriented approach. It builds upon regulatory policy 
instruments to set incentives for the generally direct application of specific energy carriers as well 
as energy conversion and electricity generation technologies. Hence, this approach relies on 
technology promotion. It may include quotas, norms, and subsidies for emission free technologies 
such as nuclear energy, renewable energy sources (RES), carbon capture and storage (CCS), as 
well as efficiency improvements of conventional generation (e. g. CHP). Administrative 
technology oriented approaches can be considered technology push strategies. 
The EU approach for GHG control 
In the current debate on GHG control, in its Presidency Conclusion of March 2007 the EU 
commission (EU (2007)) propagates an Energy Policy for Europe that includes both of the 
strategies identified above. First, EU (2007) announces an absolute GHG emission cap that yields 
emission reductions of at least 20 % in 2020 compared to 1990. Second, it installs a binding 
target of a 20 % share of RES in overall EU energy consumption by 2020.1
The propositions in EU (2007) are problematic in at least two senses. First, the RES target is 
relevant for total primary energy consumption. However, GHG control strategies in general as 
well as this paper specifically emphasize the importance of the electricity sector which is why we 
specify RES targets for the electricity mix. For the EU-15 the Directive on the promotion of 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market EU (2001) 
defines national RES quotas for the electricity mix up to 2010. Although there is no directive 
which states binding targets for the new member states, data is given by Eurostat (2007). Figure 1 
displays resulting quotas for 2010. The national targets combined yield a quota of 22 % for the 
entire EU-15 (cf. EU (2001)). From 2010 onward no sector detailed targets are defined. This is 
why we draw upon an exemplary proposal of the German Renewable Energy Federation which 
suggests a RES share in electricity generation of 35 % from 2020 onward (cf. BEE (2006)). 
Second, EU (2007) explicitly stipulates that an EU member burden sharing scheme yet is 
necessary for a cost efficient achievement of the two targets emission reduction and RES share. 
However, the differentiated national targets of such a burden sharing agreement are yet to be 
negotiated for the time after 2010. Difficulty in defining a burden sharing for a RES target lies in 
the very different national power plant systems and technical potentials among the EU member 
states. Whereas especially the new member states (except Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 
historically have only fragmentarily implemented RES in their electricity mix, in the EU-15 RES 
play a more important role. This is possibly also due to targets having been established earlier by 
the EU directive. 
By following the two strategies EU (2007) not only aims at improving environmental 
compatibility with respect to GHG control. Explicit complementary goals are those of the energy 
policy triangle, namely to enhance the economic efficiency of the energy system, and to increase 
energy security. Consequently, we assess the impact on the policy triangle imposed by the two 
policy instruments cap and trade and RES quota as well by the combination of the two. Using a 
CGE model, we compare their effectiveness in GHG mitigation, their economic efficiency, and 
                                                 
1 The overall emission reduction will be increased to 30 % if other major industrialized countries impose 
significant reductions as well. Another important pillar is to increase energy efficiency by 20 % 
compared to baseline development in 2020. Notwithstanding the fact that this approach could also be 
analysed with our model NEWAGE-W, it cannot be discussed within the limited scope of this paper. 
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 their impacts on security of supply. To highlight the impact of diverse starting points regarding 
RES application this paper differentiates between EU-15 RES policy and cohesive EU-25 RES 
policies. We start our analysis with policies for the EU-15 due to the fact that here, RES targets 
have long been established. Additional emphasis is then laid on the effect of a cohesive EU-25 
approach in contrast to a single EU-15 RES policy. 
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Figure 1. RES actual share and target share in electricity consumption in the EU-25 (Eurostat 2007) 
 
Methodological Approach 
The CGE Model NEWAGE-W 
In applied economic research, Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling has been 
shown to provide a well established instrument for the quantification of the direct and indirect 
economic impacts of climate and energy policy measures. A CGE analysis of the implications of 
policy induced changes in the electricity system needs to incorporate explicitly generation 
technology specifications. To meet this requirement the paper at hand modifies and uses the CGE 
model NEWAGE-W as developed in Küster et al. (2007) and Zürn et al. (2005). The NEWAGE-
W version applied here is a recursive dynamic, technology rich, multi-sectoral world economy 
model with ten regions, including Germany, the EU-15, and the EU-25. In each region 13 
industries produce output by applying four primary factors, namely capital, skilled labor, 
unskilled labor, and exhaustible energy resources. Households and government are represented by 
a single regional representative agent. The model base year is 2001. The model is calibrated 
towards the GTAP database Version 6 from 2005 (cf. GTAP (2005)) so that underlying data for 
production and trade consistently follow the economic input-output concept. 
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 A specific aspect of NEWAGE-W is the integration of bottom-up detail into a top-down general 
equilibrium framework. Different to most existing CGE models, NEWAGE-W follows a hybrid 
approach where overall production of the sector electricity production is not modeled as a 
standard aggregated production function but as an aggregate of technological detailed single 
technology CES functions. Following Zürn et al. (2006) and Zürn et al. (2005), 13 distinct 
generation technologies are modeled. Every single generation technology is considered with 
technology specific cost shares and energy input and emission intensities. Regionally 
differentiated cost data is applied where available. The technologies are characterized by a strict 
Leontief nesting for all inputs. In the case of fossil fired generation technologies the input of 
energy is connected with CO2 allowance input. Single technology outputs are aggregated in a 
production function which represents the national power plant system. Aggregation is structured 
by differentiating between base, middle, and peak load technology application. In order to 
account for the specific role of renewable energy technologies, the nesting in this version of 
NEWAGE-W moreover distinguishes between renewable and non-renewable energy carriers 
applied in generation. Amongst the renewable energy branch we differentiate between adjustable 
and stochastic production technologies. The resulting electricity portfolio which consists of 16 
generation options is where substitution patterns may take place. Hence, substitutions in the 
electricity sector are not directly occurring with respect to primary factors in the technology 
production function but rather by the structure of the electricity mix. The electricity sector as a 
whole is displayed in Figure 2. Specific elasticities of substitutions are implemented in every nest 
and reflect different ease of substitution on inter- and intraload levels and for fluctuating and 
constant generation levels. 
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Figure 2. Electricity CES production function 
The bottom-up integration enables us to model technology oriented policies in a comprehensive 
economic framework. For the paper at hand, it allows for the novel modeling of a quota of 
renewable energies applied in overall electricity generation. The quota modeling is in principle 
oriented at Böhringer and Rutherford (2005) who develop a stylized CGE model with renewable 
energy targets. In order to implement a RES quota in generation, we exogenously define a 
cumulative quantity constraint on the share of electricity originating from RES. The quantity 
constraint relates to a complementary endogenous subsidy on RES application. By using an 
endogenously computed subsidy for the integration of RES into the electricity mix, the model 
makes allowance for the additional electricity system costs through the application of the more 
cost intensive RES technologies that have to be borne by the economy. 
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 Scenario definition 
We apply the model for the comparative analysis of four scenarios. Even though the scenarios do 
not completely capture the recent policy approach of EU (2007), they reflect specific instruments 
of the two discussed EU GHG control strategies. Whereas RES targets are implemented in the 
model according to the EU policy, the emission budget for the cap and trade regime in our 
scenarios is based on the Kyoto protocol only. The result analyses focus on the impact on the EU, 
especially the EU-15. The scenario compositions are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Scenario table 
K R K+R K+R-EU25 
Kyoto forever emission trading 
system between all effective 
Annex-B countries with Kyoto 
EU target constant at -8 % from 
2010 onward 
RES target for EU-
15 only yielding at 
least 35 % from 
2020 onward 
K plus additional RES 
target for EU-15 only 
yielding at least 35 % 
from 2020 onward 
K+R plus additional 
RES targets for the 
new member states 
(NMS-10) 
 
The fist scenario K considers an emission standard including allowance trade between countries 
involved in emission reduction, i.e. EU-25 and effective other Annex-B countries. The emission 
caps reflect national goals of the Kyoto protocol which are considered to be constant and 
effective even after the first commitment period. The second scenario R is technology oriented. It 
implements an endogenously specified subsidy on technologies using renewable energy sources 
in a way that a share of RES in the EU-15 electricity mix correspondent to EU targets as given in 
EU (2001) and in BEE (2006) is achieved.2 The third scenario K+R combines both promotion of 
RES technologies for the EU-15 as well as emission caps and allowance trade of the Kyoto 
forever case K. The fourth scenario K+R-EU25 widens the scope of the technology strategy onto 
the EU-25 so that all EU countries are obliged to fulfill the RES target shares. This highlights the 
role of harmonization and unification in EU climate and energy policy. 
For the model regions the targets relevant for 2010 are 12.5 % for Germany, 25 % for the 
aggregate of all other members of the EU-15, and 11 % for the ten new member states of the 
EU-25. This decomposition is consistent to the overall target of 22 % for the EU-15, and 21 % for 
the EU-25 in 2010. From 2020 onward, EU member countries unilaterally must achieve a 35 % 
RES share. Further restrictions concerning the energy system that hold true for all scenarios are a 
limited physical potential for the renewable energy carriers hydropower and biomass and the 
nuclear phase out accord for Germany. 
 
 
                                                 
2 EU (2001) defines renewable electricity as the share of electricity produced from RES in total 
electricity consumption. The latter includes imports and exports of electricity. Electricity generated 
from pumped hydro storage by definition is not considered as a renewable source of energy. For 
reasons of methodology, this paper considers RES shares in electricity production. 
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 Comparative analysis of impact on effectiveness, efficiency, and security of supply 
Electricity production structure 
The primary objective of cap and trade regimes as well as of increasing the share of RES is to 
decrease energy related CO2 emissions. Whereas the ecological effectiveness of a cap and trade 
regime is given by definition of the overall emission budget, the emission impact of the 
promotion of RES is determined endogenously on the market by application of the technologies. 
For both policies, NEWAGE-W detects significant changes in the electricity mix based on 
changes in technologies’ and energy carriers’ comparative advantages. Figure 3 compares 
scenario specific electricity mixes for the EU-15. 
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Figure 3. Electricity generation mix in the EU-15 
The RES quota is mainly fulfilled by using biomass and geothermal power where the application 
of the latter is unrestricted in this model version. Nuclear power is less used, when RES quotas 
are applied. It is striking that inducing a quota strongly increases overall electricity production, 
namely by 17 % in 2030 in EU-15 compared to the case K. When quotas are implemented in the 
new member states as well, production increases by 33 % in the EU-25. This effect is to be 
interpreted with caution. It shows that under a quota regime our model tends to increase overall 
electricity production in order to fulfill the cumulative quantity constraint on the share of 
electricity originating from RES. 
Effectiveness 
The displayed changes in the electricity sector in addition with substitutions in the consumption 
of fossil fuels in the rest of the economy induce changes in the emission balance. Our model 
results show that without applying a cap, CO2 emissions will increase by approx. 11.5 % in the 
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 3EU-15 in 2030 (Case R compared to case K).  Installing a share of RES in electricity generation 
cannot offset the increase of emissions that occurs in the lack of binding caps as shown in Figure 
4. It is important to understand that the increase in emissions in scenario R compared to the 
scenario K is not principally due to the RES subsidy but to the lack of a binding cap. In 
combination with a cap, RES quotas may only slightly decrease emissions, as indicated by the 
small deviation K+R to K and K+R-EU25 to K in Figure 4. Thus, ecological effectiveness is 
remote. 
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Figure 4. CO2 emissions 
Efficiency 
Efficiency of the policy instruments can be tested by various model variables. Here, we consider 
GDP impacts, and changes in the Hicks equivalent welfare index (HEV). Figure 5 displays GDP 
and welfare impact of the scenarios R, K+R, and K+R-EU25 compared to the scenario K. GDP is 
given for the EU-25, the EU-15 and the ten new member states (NMS-10). The welfare index 
HEV cannot be aggregated to these regions due to methodological constraints and is rather given 
for the model regions Germany, the EU-15 without Germany, and the NMS-10. The results 
indicate that implementation of RES targets depress GDP in the EU-15 by approx. 0.75 % in 
2030 compared to the mere cap and trade case K. When targets are imposed in the new member 
states as well, the GDP contraction is 0.87 % for the EU-25 in 2030. In this case, it is especially 
the new member states that suffer growth losses, namely 3 % in 2030. If new member states do 
not embark on RES target policy, they tend to experience positive macro-effects. Figure 5 also 
                                                 
3 When comparing the case R to a reference case without neither caps nor RES targets, emissions in the 
case R would be lower by 12.4 % in EU-15 in 2030 than such a no policy reference case. This case 
cannot be presented in this limited paper. 
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 shows that in early periods macroeconomic effects are slightly positive. This suggest that there 
may be a threshold when moving from rather moderate and differentiated RES targets imposed in 
2010 to an overall target of 35 % from 2020 onward. 
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Figure 5. GDP and welfare impacts 
The HEV welfare index which founds on changes in the economic agent’s income highlights the 
economic transmission channel of subsidy supported RES targets. It captures budget effects and 
related changes in the income constraints imposed by the endogenous subsidy. Our results show 
that HEV welfare effects are analogous to the production effects reflected by the GDP. The HEV 
effect clearly shows the tightening of the income constraint through the subsidy in the scenarios 
R, K+R, and K+R-EU25 compared to K. In the long run, the effect is stronger for the single 
country Germany than it is for the rest of the European economy. One reason for this is the 
undifferentiated target from 2020 onward which leaves Germany with an obligation for a high 
increase in RES application (from 12.5 % in 2010) compared to the rest of the EU-15 (from 22 % 
in 2010). 
Security of Supply 
The energy security impact imposed by the two GHG control policies is exemplarily presented by 
the development of energy carrier imports into the EU-15 and the EU-25 respectively. Table 2 
shows that coal imports are significantly reduced over time when a cap and trade regime is 
applied (scenarios K, K+R, and K+R-EU25). Gas imports increase which reflects the switch from 
coal to gas under emission caps. In all scenarios, the most important exporter to Europe is Russia 
with a share of total imports of approx. 46 % in EU-15 and around approx. 54 % in EU-25 in 
2030. Crude oil imports increase in all scenarios with OPEC decreasing and Russia increasing 
their market shares in all scenarios. Contrasting the fuel type specific effects under cap and trade 
regimes, in general coal import experiences the by far strongest effects. Analogous, the case R 
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 imposes large changes in the coal import situation but only moderate changes in gas and crude oil 
imports compared to the other three scenarios. Comparing the scenarios that combine RES quotas 
with cap and trade regimes, it becomes obvious that the technology oriented policy cannot reduce 
European import dependency. 
Table 2. Energy carrier imports into EU 
Energy 
Carrier 
Region 
considered Scenario 2001 2010 2020 2030 
Coal K EU-15 100 88 70 61 
 R EU-15 100 105 108 106 
 K+R EU-15 100 88 71 62 
 K+R-EU25 EU-25 100 82 58 45 
Gas K EU-15 100 106 109 106 
 R EU-15 100 109 114 112 
 K+R EU-15 100 106 109 107 
 K+R-EU25 EU-25 100 107 111 112 
Crude Oil K EU-15 100 104 106 106 
 R EU-15 100 111 118 118 
 K+R EU-15 100 104 106 106 
 K+R-EU25 EU-25 100 105 108 109 
 
Conclusions 
Our model results suggest that for reasons of effectiveness, economic efficiency, and security of 
supply a GHG control strategy should not merely rely on technology oriented policies. 
Combining a technology oriented strategy with a cap and trade strategy may only slightly further 
decrease emissions. However, this reduction is accompanied by negative growth impacts. The 
fact that electricity production significantly increases when technology quotas are installed while 
at the same time GDP contracts is a strong indicator for inefficiencies in the energy system. 
Whereas moderate RES targets basically do not affect macro-economic growth, an increase up to 
35 % has significant negative impacts. EU import dependency is decreased when emission 
standards cap fossil fuel consumption whereas renewable energy quotas do not decrease import 
dependency. An important result is that harmonization of RES technology oriented EU policy has 
negative economic implications especially for the new member states but also for the entire 
EU-25. This suggests that a cohesive strategy should provide differentiated goals for all member 
states and beyond what is regulated by the EU directive for the year 2010. Alternative to 
administrative individual targets, a corporate RES strategy could also found on tradable RES 
certificates with market mechanism inducing optimal burden sharing. 
Hence, considering the preliminary goal of GHG abatement as well as the complementary goals 
of economic efficiency and energy security, we conclude that the changes in generation 
technology application necessary for climate protection are best achieved through the 
implementation of emission permits tradable on perfect allowance markets. Our concrete scenario 
examples suggest that market pull strategies excel over technology push strategies for GHG 
control. If an EU wide RES target is to be applied, the design of the related EU burden sharing 
will strongly affect its economic impact. 
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 In addition to what is discussed in this paper, regarding the emission cap and trade strategy, 
further options for the design of a Post-Kyoto protocol as well as concrete 20 % reduction target 
of EU (2007) need to be considered. Regarding the electricity technology oriented strategy a 
further step would be to also assess and compare the impacts of other technology options for 
GHG control such as nuclear energy, CO2 capture and storage, and energy saving through 
efficiency in production and consumption. 
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